A Theory of Scientific Practice by Ghassib, Hisham
A Theory of Scientific Practice 
Hisham Ghassib 
ghassib@psut.edu.jo 
The Princess Sumaya University for Technology (PSUT), 
P.O.Box 1438, Al-Jubaiha 11941, Jordan 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper avers that science is not demarcated from other disciplines by a 
specific unique methodology, but by its specific scientific rationality and 
rational grounds. In this context, the notion and structure of scientific reason are 
explicated. Four rational grounds of science are identified: the epistemological. 
Ontological, ethical and sociological grounds. They are discussed in detail 
within the context of classical physics, relativistic physics and quantum physics. 
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1- Introduction 
Knowledge is a peculiar social product. It is the only a priori 
unenvisageable social product. It is so by nature. An envisageable  
knowledge is a contradiction in terms. Accordingly, there is no 
assembly-line-like method for producing knowledge. In short, there is 
no such thing as a specific scientific method, with specific universal 
steps to be universally followed. Every research leader has his own 
method of thinking and discovery. There is a family resemblance 
between the various methods, but they are quite distinct. Of course, 
scientists learn from each other. Usually, a novice scientist starts with 
his mentor's methodology, but as his research and problem-solving 
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develops and evolves, he modifies his methodology accordingly, and 
this could lead him to inventing an altogether new methodology. 
Every methodology has its limits. When it no longer serves as a tool 
of discovery, it is transcended to another, generally more 
comprehensive, methodology. Thus, methodology is an organism that 
evolves. Generally speaking, we can say that every discovery and 
theoretical breakthrough entails a methodological breakthrough. In 
fact, methodology and theory are dialectically related. They are 
different faces of the same coin. Methodology is active theory. Each 
methodology is a key to an aspect of reality. We need to constantly 
develop methodology in order to unlock more of its aspects. 
Does this mean science cannot be demarcated from other cultural 
practices-- from philosophical, religious, magical, astrological, 
mystical, alchemical, and artistic practices? Does the denial of the 
existence of the scientific method entail the interpenetration of 
various cultural constructs, and the impossibility of demarcating 
science from other cultural practices? (Feyerabend, 1978). 
Not in the least. I aver that scientific practice is a distinct practice that 
can be demarcated rather precisely from other cultural practices. In 
that case, what are the distinguishing features of scientific practice? 
 
2- A Theory of Scientific Practice 
Science is not distinguished from other cultural disciplines by its 
methodology, but, rather, by its rationality and intellectual grounds. It 
entails a distinct, though evolving, rationality, and is based on a set of 
specific grounds. It entails the existence of a scientific reason, and a 
set of grounds-- epistemological, ontological, ethical and sociological 
grounds. 
 
2.1- The Epistemological Grounds of Scientific Practice 
a- Science is a self-contained whole-- a closed epistemological 
universe. It does not recognize any epistemological reference point 
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beyond itself. It does not recognize any authority outside itself. Its 
criteria of validation and truth lie within itself. Its very truth lies 
within itself. Its only reference point is scientific reasoning. The 
essence of scientific reasoning is the necessary dialectical synthesis 
between mathematized theorization and precise experimentation and 
measurement (Ghassib, 1992). In this regard, we are justified in 
talking about scientific reason, a specific reason with a specific 
structure. We shall later on devote a whole section for a detailed 
treatment of scientific reason. The essence, spirit and only reference 
point of science is scientific reason. It is what gives science its unique 
character. It informs the infinite variety of methods, which we call 
scientific methods. Thus, the unifying element of science is not the 
scientific method, which is actually a myth, but, rather, scientific 
rationality, scientific reason. 
b- Scientific knowledge is theoretically structured. Theory is the 
necessary form of scientific knowledge. Thus, the latter is necessarily 
structured and ordered. It is necessarily systematized and structurally 
constituted. Its ideal image is mathematics-- mathematical 
constructions. Thus, it is necessarily axiomatized. Its basic form is 
mathematico-conceptual constructions on the basis of a set of axioms. 
However, unlike mathematical axioms, which are ideal and arbitrary, 
and unlike religious axioms, which are absolute and absolutely 
certain, scientific axioms are relative and real. They are relative in the 
sense that they are conditioned and limited. They are true under 
certain conditions and within specific limits. They are real in the 
sense that they are constantly subject to critique, empirical 
verification and revision. They are not static, but constantly evolve. 
c- In science, there is always appearance and reality. Both classical 
physics and quantum physics acknowledge that, even though the 
latter has transformed the way we view the relationship between 
them. Appearance is principally subjective, even though it appears 
objective. It gives the illusion of being objective. In so far as it is 
considered objective, it is highly deceptive. Science views it as a 
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mere token of reality. It is a mere sign that points to an underlying 
reality.  It views it as the result of the action of the underlying reality 
onto the senses. Even in quantum mechanics, the underlying reality is 
considered qualitatively more objective than the appearance, even 
though it is not considered wholly objective (Heisenberg, 1949). In 
science, the senses are considered approximate and defective 
measuring instruments. Thus, they are not adequate for exploring 
reality. We need to construct more accurate measuring devices on the 
basis of mathematized theory. That is, we need scientific reason to 
discover and probe reality. Scientific reason is our main instrument to 
probe reality. It is our eye onto reality. We do not see reality with our 
eyes, but with our scientific reason. 
d- Scientific vision is in many respects Platonic. It deals with ideal 
representations and abstractions. The basic unit of scientific vision is 
the possible ideal physical system. This is more of a model of reality 
than a real representation. It is abstracted from reality. In this sense, it 
bears resemblance to reality, but it is basically an ideal representation 
of reality. It is usually approximately realizable in reality via 
experiment. It is described in terms of certain properties and 
constructs. These are specifiable in terms of mathematics and 
measurement. Their essential form of representation is mathematics 
and entails precise measurement. The laws of nature are durable 
relations between these primary qualities and constructs. Science is 
basically a quest for new such primary qualities and constructs 
(physical quantities) and the relations between them, and for their 
manifestations in specific instances. Thus, the laws of nature are also 
ideal. They are not merely relations governing the real world, but are 
universal active forms governing all possible ideal physical systems-- 
that is, the space of all possible ideal situations. Thus, in a sense, the 
laws of nature are prior to nature and above it. They are more akin to 
universal Platonic forms, which are not only more real than nature 
itself, but the source of its reality (Ghassib, 2010). Experiment is the 
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necessary bridge between the general ideal world and the real world 
(Bhaskar, 1978). 
e- Scientific practice is intrinsically critical. It does not accept events, 
phenomena and things at their face value. It does not readily accept 
the given. It constantly questions what is given. Crude direct 
empiricism is alien to it. It critiques the given to reveal its reality. It 
never treats a given item in isolation from its conditions of existence. 
It constantly questions, critiques, and looks for connections and 
grounds. In this respect, scientific practice is intrinsically causal. 
f- Scientific practice is intrinsically holistic. Context is all important 
to it. It seeks deeper unities. It realizes that wholes manifest 
themselves in seemingly isolated fragments. Thus, it is in a constant 
quest for identity connections, contexts, conditions and identities 
(Bohm, 1985). 
2.1.1 Scientific Reason 
The essence of scientific reason, which is the cornerstone of scientific 
practice, is the dialectical relationship between mathematized 
theorization and precise experimentation and measurement. However, 
this relationship is a complex multi-faceted relationship. It consists of 
a number of organically inter-related methodological operations, that 
constantly transform each side as such, in addition to transforming 
one side into the other. The main methodological operations 
constituting this relationship are the following: 
2.1.1.1- Induction: This is supposed to be the very essence of modern 
scientific practice. But, in fact, it is one of many fundamental 
methodological operations, and obtains its validity from the whole. It 
is the operation of legitimate generalization. That is, it is the 
movement from the particular to the general-- from a limited and 
finite set of measurements to a general statement. It is normally not a 
routine, straight-forward, mechanical operation, but, rather, a very 
complex, imaginative and creative process. In addition to employing 
various, sometimes sophisticated, mathematical techniques, this 
operation sometimes entails building new models, and is often guided 
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by new physical principles. In fact, induction is a form of reading, or 
interpretation. It is an interpretation of a set of measurements in terms 
of possible real situations, using mathematical, physical and 
philosophic models and principles. In the history of science, induction 
is a family of operations, rather than one specific and unique 
operation. This is clearly epitomized in such well-known examples 
as: Ohm's law, Kepler's laws of planetary motions (Stephenson, 
1987), and Rutherford's discovery of the Atomic nucleus (Kragh, 
1999). 
2.1.1.2- Deduction: This is supposed to be the opposite of induction-- 
that is, the movement from the general to the specific or particular. In 
a sense, it is the reduction of the general universal form of a law of 
nature to a specific manifestation of it. It is the concretization of 
theory. Deduction is the logico-mathematical development of a 
theory, the purpose of which is to make the theory functional. For the 
theory to become comprehensive and to appropriate reality, it must be 
developed in this way. Thus, deduction is the logico-mathematical 
mechanism, whereby theory appropriates the concrete-- reality. This 
is clearly illustrated by such renouned instances of deduction as 
Galileo's discovery of the parabolic nature of parabolic paths (Galileo, 
1954), Newton's deduction of Kepler's laws of planetary motions 
(Bernard Cohen,1983), Hamilton's deduction of classical mechanics 
(Hankins, 1985), Maxwell's deduction of the existence of 
electromagnetic waves (Ghassib, 1988), Einstein's deduction of the 
Lorentz transformations from the basic axioms of special relativity 
(Einstein, 1998), the deduction of the existence of black holes from 
general relativity (Hawking et. Al., 1987), Scrodinger's deduction of 
the spectrum of the hydrogen atom from his wave equation (Ludwig, 
1968), and Dirac's deduction of the existence of anti-matter from his 
wave equation (Kvasnica, 1964), amongst others. 
The Conditions and Functions of Deduction: 
Deduction, which, in modern physics, flows from the 
mathematization of nature, and expressing the laws of nature in terms 
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of differential equations, has endowed modern physics with an 
uncanny, almost magical, power. It is an incredible undreamt of 
power. It has turned scientific theories into exceedingly powerful 
engines of knowledge production and unification. Deduction lies at 
the basis of explanation and prediction (Balashov et. al., 2002). A 
phenomenon or event is explained when it is deduced mathematically 
and logically from a set of principles. Thus, it could be said that 
Newton's deduction of Kepler's laws of planetary motions, and 
Schrodinger's deduction of the spectrum of the hydrogen atom from 
his wave equation were explanations of these phenomena. When 
Hans Bethe deduced the enormous emergy output of the sun from 
nuclear reactions, he furnished an explanation of the existence of the 
sun for the first time in history (Kragh, 1999). The blueness of the sky 
was explained the moment wave theorists were able to deduce the law 
of scattering of light waves from air molecules (Sommerfeld, 1964). 
However, deduction also lies at the basis of prediction. The glory of 
modern physics flows out of its tremendous predictive power. When 
new unknown results are deduced and properly interpreted, they are 
called predictions. Thus, the deductions of time dilation, length 
contraction, black holes, the expansion of global space, anti-matter 
and suchlike are predictions. Theories are supposed to be explanatory 
and predictive, if they are to be taken seriously. These functions are 
essential features of a successful theory. Thus, despite its formidable 
equations and concepts, Einstein's general relativity was quickly 
accepted because it could satisfactorily explain-- that is, 
mathematically deduce-- the precession of the perihelion of mercury, 
and because it predicted the precise impact of gravitation on light 
beams (Eisenstaedt, 2006). Thus, deduction is the very spirit of 
theory. 
With the calculus, deduction has become truly a substantial 
development of theory, a positive process, and not a mere logical or 
syllogistic exercise. However, for a theory to be deductive, it must be 
endowed with a sufficiently high degree of logical coherence. 
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Otherwise, deduction, as well as explanation and prediction, lose their 
meaning. For deduction to give specific, unambiguous results that 
could be tested, a theory must be logically coherent to a large extent. 
It may be that we can never construct a perfectly logically coherent 
theory. Thus, it is a matter of degree. The limits of logical coherence 
are also limits on the efficacy of the theory. Thus, for example, the 
Big Bang theory of the Universe breaks down at the singularity-- the 
so-called moment of creation (Hawking, 1998). That is, it loses its 
logical coherence at this point. This sets a limit on the efficacy of the 
theory and motivates a search for a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework, that would cope with the singularity or eliminate it 
altogether. Accordingly, the problem of logical coherence has become 
a major problem in theoretical physics. This has reached its zenith in 
quantum field theory (Ghassib, 2009). One of the motivations for 
developing string theory has been to overcome the problem of logical 
coherence in quantum field theory (Green, 1999). This poses the 
question: In view of this problem, is there a limit to universality and 
comprehensiveness of a theory? Is a theory of everything impossible? 
If so, is it a mere epistemological limit, related to the limits of human 
brain power, or is it an ontological limit, related to the nature of the 
Universe? (Weinberg, 1992). 
2.1.1.3- Tests: 
By testing a theory, we mean developing it by deduction-- that is, by 
applying it to a possible reproducible ideal system-- reproducing the 
system in reality (usually in the lab), and comparing the theoretical 
deductive results with the experimental results. Thus, it involves 
deduction, prediction and experimentation. Theories always seek to 
be tested. Tests are necessary not only for validation, but also for 
specifying the theory and its path of development. Tests have 
acquired a crucial importance in the 20th century, in view of the 
barrage of unfamiliar, almost crazy, ideas that century witnessed, 
such as time dilation (Rosser, 1971), and De Broglie's matter waves 
(Eisberg, 1961). 
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2.1.1.4- Hypothesis: 
Often, the prevalent theoretical framework is not sufficiently specific 
to lend itself to direct explanatory deduction. It usually provides a 
space of possibilities, rather than specific and definite deductions. 
Sometimes, it proves to be inadequate and incomplete. In those cases, 
explanatory models are constructed out of a combination of existing 
theoretical elements and reasonable assumptions, which need to be 
justified and confirmed later. Such models are called hypotheses. 
When logically and experimentally confirmed, these hypotheses are 
incorporated into the theoretical corpus. Thus, they are a means of 
enriching and expanding the theoretical edifice, and even concretizing 
it. However, during periods of crises and revolutions, they could be 
means of undermining and demolishing the existing theoretical 
edifice. For example, in 1894, Max Planck turned his attention to the 
so-called problem of the black body radiation. He applied the grand 
classical theoretical corpus to the radiation trapped in a cavity at 
equilibrium, and analyzed it in terms of an interaction between the 
trapped radiation and presumed field oscillators constituting the walls 
of the cavity. To start with, he made it a point to stick to those parts of 
the classical corpus, which he deemed reliable, such as classical 
mechanics, thermodynamics and classical electrodynamics. However, 
he soon realized that this theoretical core was inadequate for 
explaining the spectrum of black body radiation. So, he realized he 
had to introduce Boltzmann's statistical mechanics, even though he 
abhorred it. This led him to the brink of a successful explanation, at 
the turn of the 20th century, but not quite. He realized that he had to 
introduce a somewhat alien hypothesis-- the so-called quantum 
hypothesis. The latter stipulates that energy is absorbed and emitted 
by the field oscillators discretely or discontinuously, in packets, the 
energy of each of which is proportional to the frequency of the 
absorbed or emitted radiation. Thus, he had to introduce an element 
from the outside. This element was not only an outside element, but 
proved to be contradictory to some basic principles of the classical 
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theoretical corpus (Kuhn, 1978). In fact, by 1925, it led to 
undermining this grand corpus, replacing it with quantum mechanics 
(Hoffmann, 1986). Another pertinent example is Einstein's axiom of 
the constancy of the speed of light. This started out as a crazy 
hypothesis, but its incredible successes in explaining and predicting 
phenomena soon turned it into a fundamental principle of physics. 
2.1.1.5- Gedanken Experiment: 
The Platonic feature of scientific practice reveals itself most 
conspicuously in gedanken or thought experiments, which have 
played a crucial role in the history of scientific innovation. A 
gedanken experiment is an ideal physical system, which is most often 
unrealizable in practice under the prevailing conditions and 
circumstances . It has various functions, such as clarifying a principle 
by concretizing it, critiquing a concept or principle, clarifying its 
actual meaning, showing its reasonableness, absurdity or 
contradictions and problems, and revealing its nature. Well-known 
examples are Galileo's moving ship experiment ( Barbour, 2001), 
Newton's cannon experiment (Bernard Cohen, 1985), Maxwell's 
demon (Kuhn, 1978), Einstein chasing a light beam (Isaacson, 2007), 
the twin paradox (French, 1968), Heisenberg's microscope (Bohm, 
1979), Schrodinger's cat, Wigner's friend and the EPR experiment 
(Gribbin, 1995). 
2.1.1.6- Critique: 
Critique plays a very important and durable part in scientific practice. 
What do we mean by critique? Critique entails revealing the hidden 
structure, internal and external contradictions and relations, limits, 
grounds, lineage and potentialities of an idea. It often entails 
deconstructing and reconstructing an idea, pointing out structural 
defects and absences in the idea critiqued, and evaluating and 
assessing various aspects of an idea. Amongst the most crucial 
instances of critique in the history of science are Aristotle's critique of 
Plato, his contemporaries and predecessors (Aristotle, 1978), Al-
Hazen's critique of Greek optics (Rashed, 2003), Galileo's critique of 
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Aristotle (Drake, 1999), Newton's critique of Descartes (Koyre, 
1957), Mach's critique of Newtonian mechanics (Smart, 1964), 
Einstein's critique of classical kinematics and Bohr's and Heisenberg's 
critique of calssical concepts (Heisenberg, 1971; Beller, 1999). 
2.1.1.7- Dialectical Synthesis: 
This is an often neglected methodological operation. But, it is 
indispensable. Its crucial importance is revealed when we pose the 
following question: How are theories constructed? I aver that theory 
construction cannot be comprehended without this operation. 
Induction and deduction are not adequate to explain this major part of 
scientific practice. By dialectical relation, I mean a necessary, 
existential, transformational and contradictory relation. Dialectical 
synthesis is merging different, contradictory elements into new, more 
encompassing elements, resolving the contradictions in the process. 
Theory develops principally in this manner. It develops by resolving 
contradictions via dialectical synthesis. Theories do not emerge in 
isolation from each other, but in deep connection. Theories give birth 
to each other; they generate each other dialectically. Thus, theory is 
an evolving organism (Ghassib, 1988). The major instances of 
dialectical synthesis are Galileo's synthesis of Archimedes' 
mathematical method with Platonic idealism, Neton's grand synthesis 
of Galileo's terrestrial mechanics and Kepler's celestial mechanics 
(Bernard Cohen et. al., 1983), Hamilton's grand synthesis of classical 
mechanics (Lanczos, 1970), Maxwell's Unification of Electricity and 
Magnetism (Ghassib, 1988), Boltzmann's statistical mechanics 
(Kuhn, 1978), Einstein's special relativity (Jammer, 2006), 
Minkowski's spacetime (Lawden, 1968), Einstein's general relativity 
(Pais, 2005), the Schrodinger equation (Ghassib, 1983), Dirac's 
relativistic wave equation (Kvasnica, 1964), and the electroweak 
synthesis (Pagels, 1986).  
2.1.1.8- Significant Observation: 
By significant observation, we mean reading a grand fact or principle 
in a simple small quantitative difference. Like any ability to read, this 
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requires a highly trained and qualified mind-- a fully prepared, 
theoretically structured mind. It is more of a discursive than a raw 
intuitive power. Significant observation reveals itself so clearly in 
such celebrated examples as Eratosthenes' measurement of the 
circumference of the Earth (Sarton, 1987), Newton's analysis of 
circular motion (Bernard Cohen, 1985), Maxwell's unification 
scheme, and Einstein's equivalence principle. 
 
2.2- The Ontological Grounds of Scientific Practice 
I want to explore the crisis of meaning in physics by making a 
detailed fundamental comparison between classical physics and 
quantum mechanics, ontologically, methodologically, and logically. 
I will start by addressing the problem of objective reality in physics. 
This can be approached via the question of ontology in physics. By 
ontology, we mean the theory of being. 
It seems to me that scientific practice, at least within the context of 
classical physics, entails the following ontology: 
1- There is a mind-independent reality underlying all phenomena and 
events. 
2- This reality is knowable via scientific rationality. 
3- Ultimate reality is ordered-- that is, it is structured and governed by 
natural laws. We must not take the meaning of natural laws for 
granted. We will explore their meaning later when we talk about 
quantum mechanics. 
4- Nature is an infinite physical system consisting of interacting 
material components. Whether these components exist on their own 
or in relation to each other and to the whole is an open question. The 
laws of nature are obeyed by all subsystems. It is assumed that they 
are obeyed by the whole--the Universe-- as well. 
5- The laws of nature are infinitely universal, in the sense that they 
apply universally to all possible, including ideal limiting, physical 
systems. These laws condition nature, but are not conditioned by it. 
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6- Interactions between material components are the ultimate cause of 
events and changes in the universe. Interaction is the essence of 
scientific explanation. 
7- There is a contradictory dislocation between appearance and 
reality. What bridges the gap is the theory of interaction. In this 
respect, interaction is truly the essence of modern physics. 
This analysis should be concretized by inquiring about how possible 
physical systems are characterized. In classical mechanics, they are 
generally characterized by primary qualities, or physical quantities. 
These are objective primary properties, whose representational form 
is mathematics, and which are measurable without theoretical limits. 
The objective of science is to discover these primary properties, 
discover the connections between them, and specify their values for 
specific systems using these relations, which we call the laws of 
nature. 
Does this ontology accord with quantum mechanics? 
Quantum mechanics does not start with well-defined physical 
quantities. Rather, it starts with state vectors, which are vectors in 
Hilbert space. Then, it introduces linear Hermitian operators, which 
represent so-called observables, rather than physical quantities as 
such. These operators act on state vectors to yield a spectrum of 
eigenvalues, which are possible values of the observables. The act of 
measurement selects a specific value. In general, the state vector is a 
linear combination of the eigenfunctions, with the coefficients 
representing the probability amplitudes of the various eigenvalues and 
eigenfunctions. The act of measurement makes the state vector 
collapse into a specific eigenfunction. Not all observables are 
compatible with each other, which means that they cannot all be 
specified simultaneously. This incompatibility depends on the 
experimental conditions (Bohm,  1979).  
Notice that this scheme accords right from the start a special status to 
the act of measurement. What are the implications of this 
formulation? 
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1- Reality is not purely objective. It is measurement dependent. Is 
measurement a subjective act? Is it basically an interaction with a 
macroscopic object? Or, is it theory laden, and, therefore, an 
embodiment of human reason? If the former, then some sort of holism 
is implied. If the latter, then some sort of subjective idealism is 
implied (Heisenberg, 1979;  Reichenbach, 1975). 
2- Since human acts play a role in constituting reality, to what extent 
can we say that reality is knowable? 
3- Since probability plays such an important role, to what extent can 
we say that reality is ordered? The laws of nature are no longer causal 
relations between objective properties, but, rather, relations between 
observables, which cannot be defined without human acts. If so, to 
what extent can we say reality is ordered? 
4- The concept of possible physical system is retained. However, the 
relationship between the sub-system and the whole becomes much 
more problematic (Bohm et. al., 1993). 
5- Physical laws retain their universal character, but lose their self-
sufficiency. They do not stand on their own, but require random 
subjective lawless acts for their efficacy. 
6- Interaction retains its causal efficacy, but does not govern all 
events and changes. Acausal randomness plays a role (Bohm, 1957). 
7- In quantum mechanics, there is a marked dislocation between 
appearance and reality. However, reality no longer completely 
underlies appearance. The latter underlies the former as much as the 
former underlies the latter. Reality is shaped by appearance as much 
as appearance is shaped by reality. The classical asymmetry 
disappears in quantum mechanics. 
To start with, De Broglie and Schrodinger wanted to explain atomic 
phenomena in terms of a classical field equation, without violating 
classical ontology. But, they were not given the chance to develop 
their project (Beller, 1999). In particular, the latter developed the 
double solution interpretation of wave mechanics, but was terrorized 
into abandoning it for 25 years (Hiley et. al., 1997). Einstein was not 
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prepared to renounce classical ontology either. He tried to show that 
quantum mechanics was an incomplete description of nature, and that 
it was a statistical theory. Thus, there was a deeper theory, which 
accorded with classical ontology, and which underlay quantum 
mechanics. He offered a real challenge to the prevalent formulation, 
but was vehemently opposed by the Copenhagen group (Lindley, 
2007). Instead of scrutinizing his objections with an open mind, they 
employed all sorts of tricks to confute him, lightly dismiss him and 
isolate him. No doubt, quantum mechanics posed many challenges to 
classical ontology. However, instead of trying to overcome them, they 
were eager and ready to throw the baby with the tub water. It was 
pure ideology and dogma. Obviously, extra scientific factors were at 
work here. They were not ready to acknowledge the philosophical 
arbitrariness that underlay their formulation, but considered it the 
only scientifically possible formulation. It was science put in the 
service of ideology. In 1952, David Bohm offered a causal realistic 
formulation of wave mechanics, which seemed to be as good as the 
orthodox formulation. It was similar to De Broglie's formulation. 
Even though it has endured, it is still marginal. Likewise with all the 
formulations that were proposed later. The orthodox formulation is 
still prevalent, despite the challenges. The desire to renounce classical 
realism is still there. But, can we afford to persist in renouncing it? 
What are the consequences of such a renunciation  on the whole 
enterprise of physics? When the physicist formulates a theory or an 
explanation, or when he performs an experiment, or when he makes a 
prediction, he seems to tacitly assume classical realism. Thus, does 
scientific practice contradict quantum ontology? If there is such an 
irreconcilable contradiction, that could spell disaster for the very 
enterprise of physics. It is tantamount to self-destruction or suicide. 
Also, can we afford to lose the objectivity of the laws of nature? In 
the orthodox formulation, the laws of nature are no longer objective 
relations between objective physicals quantities, but, rather, relations 
between acts of measurement. That leads to the renunciation of the 
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very concept of reality. Bohr seems to acknowledge this consequence, 
but he seems to revel in it (Bohr, 1998). Heisenberg seems to consider 
reality a mere sea of potentialities (Heisenberg, 1971). It needs human 
acts to transform it into actuality. Once again, we have human act 
constituting reality. Back to good old Kant? But, they do not 
acknowledge that. Sartre could afford to propose such a dualism 
(Sartre, 1972). But, can science afford to? What are the consequences 
of such a view? I think the problem has not been addressed with the 
rigor it deserves. 
The orthodox quantum physicists start with measurement, rather than 
with objective reality, and end up with objectifying measurement, and 
subjectifying reality. They start with measurement, and end up with 
measurement. This indicates their adherence to some amalgam of 
positivism and subjective idealism. On the other hand, David Bohm 
started with well-tested theory, with Schrodinger's equation, and 
ended up with a causal realistic formulation. It seems that the starting 
and end-points depend on the philosophy you start with. This needs 
further exploration. 
Methodologically, quantum mechanics seems to turn classical physics 
on its head. 
Classical mechanics starts with definite physical meaning, gives it 
mathematical expression and arrives at general mathematical 
equations as a culmination of physical meaning. Quantum mechanics 
starts with general mathematical equations, and then starts looking for 
physical meaning, which it never seems to find. It is a never-ending 
quest for physical meaning. Even the relationship between law and 
phenomenon has been reversed. In classical physics, laws explain 
phenomena. In quantum mechanics, in a sense, phenomena explain 
laws. Phenomena are not there to be explained, but they are used to 
illuminate the meaning of laws. It is a topsy turvy world . 
Another methodological point is that, whereas in classical mechanics, 
abstraction flows out of the sensed and experienced world, and 
therefore never loses touch with the sensible in terms of meaning and 
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compliance, in quantum mechanics, it is divorced from the sensed 
world. But, at least, it establishes some sort of connection with it via 
elaborate experiment. Unfortunately, things have deteriorated in the 
last thirty years. For, even the experimental connection has been 
severed in string theory, loop quantum gravity, and related areas 
(Smolin, 2006). 
A third methodological point is that, in 20th century and 21st century 
physics, mathematical principles have become hegemonic, and have 
come to replace physical principles. This transformation started with 
Einstein, and first became manifest in his scientific career. To start 
with, Einstein was averse to complex mathematization. He insisted on 
simple physical principles with the minimum of mathematics. That is 
why he was not enthusiastic about Hermann Minkowski's 
development of special relativity. However, he soon realized that he 
could not make any progress towards a relativistic theory of 
gravitation without resorting to sophisticated mathematics. He 
succeeded in combining both views in constructing his theory of 
general relativity, which he achieved by combining simple physical 
principles with sophisticated mathematical principles. After that, he 
became so enamored and fascinated by sophisticated mathematics 
that he attempted to construct his unified field theory purely with very 
abstract geometrical principles. This was soon to become a major 
trend in all of 20th century physics. This has become particularly 
prominent in the new theoretical programs, such as m-theory, loop 
quantum gravity and other quantum gravitational formulations 
(Callender et.al., 2001). The symmetry principles of these schemes, 
including the holographic principle, can hardly be called physical 
principles. They are more accurately described as generalized 
geometrical principles. This development raises the question of 
meaning in recent physics. 
Recent physics has also highlighted the problem of coherence in 
physical theories. As theories become more mathematical and more 
sophisticated, it becomes increasingly difficult to construct a stable, 
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logically coherent, theory. This problem arose particularly forcefully 
in quantum field theory. One of the motivations for moving towards 
superstring theory was precisely to overcome the logical 
inconsistencies of quantum field theory. The latter may have solved 
some of these inconsistencies, but at the expense of losing 
experimental touch with reality. The problem is how to construct a 
logically coherent theory with full explanatory and predictive power. 
This is the problem facing theoretical physics today. Is this problem 
ontological? That is, is it rooted in reality itself? Is there an element 
of irrationality in reality itself? Or, is it an epistemological problem, 
rooted in the limitations of human reason? 
 
2.3- The Ethical Grounds of Scientific Practice  
Scientific practice is not value free. It is ethically structured. It 
presupposes a number of scientific ethical norms. Without these 
ethical principles, it will collapse. Foremost among these scientific 
ethical principles are: honesty in conducting experiments and 
constructing theories, integrity, precision, meticulousness, 
thoroughness, not jumping into conclusions, acknowledging past and 
contemporary contributions, and exhibiting team spirit. These are 
ethical conditions of proper scientific practice. 
 
2.4- The Sociological Grounds of Scientific Practice 
In this section, I do not intend to address the problem of the socio-
historical conditions for the existence and persistence of science and 
for turning it from a marginal into a major and central enterprise. I 
have developed a comprehensive theory of such conditions elsewhere 
(Ghassib, 1993). Here, I wish o outline the socio-educational grounds 
of scientific practice. In a previous work, I have constructed a theory 
of knowledge production. In this theory, I have introduced the 
important concept of epistemic heritage, which is the raw material of 
the process of knowledge production. A scientist produces knowledge 
by working on, and with, his epistemic heritage. The epistemic 
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heritage is generally a complex scheme and structure of concepts, 
implements, operations and practices. Conceptually, it is never a 
perfectly logically coherent system, but always possesses a degree of 
incoherence and inhomogeneity. Its ideal is a theory of everything, or 
a logical system akin in coherence to Euclidean geometry. However, 
in actuality, it is ridden with a degree of logical incoherence, a degree 
of logical inhomogeneity, contradictions, defects, gaps, uncertainties, 
ungrounded assumptions, conceptual haziness and unrealized 
potentialities. The scientist works on this complex edifice and with its 
elements, and systematically interacts with the object of knowledge 
with his epistemic heritage, in order to solve its contradictions, reduce 
its logical incoherence and inhomogeneity, fill in the gaps, remove 
the defects, clarify the concepts, ground its propositions, realize its 
potentialities and develop its themes. To be able to do that, a scientist 
must satisfy the following socio-educational requirements and 
conditions: 
1- He must be qualified to deal with his epistemic heritage. That is,    
he must have gone through a thorough process of delving deeply 
into his epistemic heritage, understanding it and knowing its 
structure and problems. 
2- He must have acquired the necessary mathematical, linguistic, 
conceptual and technical skills to work with it and on it. 
3- He must have acquired the skill to get access to the sources of 
new information and knowledge, to update his knowledge, and to 
keep track of the latest developments in his field. 
4- He must be emotionally committed to his scientific work, and 
be self-motivated to do the necessary hard work required for 
knowledge production. Science is a mission, rather than a routine 
career. 
5- He must be trained to adhere to scientific values and norms of 
conduct. 
6- He must be an active member of a scientific community, sharing 
with it an institutional framework, a common language, a 
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communicative network, a common epistemic heritage, and 
common problems and concerns. 
7- His scientific work must be conducted in the context of a 
research program, to which he is emotionally and intellectually 
committed. He could be either the leader and initiator of the 
research program or an active practitioner. Research programs are 
not static, of course, but evolve. 
In short, for a scientist to be a knowledge producer, he must be 
qualified and prepared intellectually, practically, emotionally and 
morally. 
 
3- Conclusion 
Scientific practice exhibits an infinite variety of methods and 
techniques. It is a creative activity, that constantly transcends 
constraints and limits. However, it is grounded in epistemological, 
ontological, ethical and socio-educational grounds, all of its own. It 
is demarcated from other human practices not by a fixed unique 
method, but by a specific scientific rationality or scientific reason, 
a specific set of epistemological principles, a specific family of 
ontologies, a specific ethic and specific socio-educational types. 
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